

MUNK CENTRE MONITOR

VIEWS, NEWS, PEOPLE AND EVENTS FROM THE MUNK CENTRE

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

MUNK CENTRE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

AT TRINITY COLLEGE



VIEW FROM THE DIRECTOR

JANICE GROSS STEIN

DEMOCRACY AS A VIRUS

Democracy is spreading like a virus around the world. More and more, medical language creeps into our political vocabulary. It is almost as if we put avian flu and democracy in the same category. Both are highly contagious, both can spread like wildfire, and both can infect those who are most susceptible. But, is this the right analogy? Is democracy like an infection that spreads from contact to contact amongst the most vulnerable? Are we on the verge of a pandemic of democracy?

It is not difficult to see why the imagery of democracy as a virus comes so quickly to mind. In the last several months, we have seen the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, elections in Palestine and in Iraq, municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, and a statement by the president of Egypt that, instead of the usual one-party show, he would encourage parties to run in the next election. Most surprising were the peaceful street demonstrations in Lebanon that culminated in the redeployment of Syrian troops to eastern Lebanon. This kind of demonstration would have been unthinkable even six months earlier.

Something important is happening, especially in the Middle East, but what is it? Is it viral democracy? Although the analogy is stretched, it does point to two important limiting conditions in the spread of democratic practices.

A virus needs a welcoming host to infect. Democracy also needs a welcoming host. Elections are only the first step in embedding democratic practices and values in societies that have experienced decades of authoritarianism. The fundamentals of democracy, we know, are the rule of law and the protection of minority rights by the majority. Respect for the rule of law and minority rights does not come easily. It requires support by an active and engaged civil society, an entrepreneurial class that sees real

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Vladimir Putin's Quest for a Strong State

COVER STORY BY PETER H. SOLOMON JR.

Recently it has become fashionable to criticize Vladimir Putin for curbing rather than encouraging democracy in Russia. Commentators point, for example, to his proposal after the September attack on the school in Beslan that Russia abandon direct elections of governors of regions and presidents of republics. The critics are right, but fail to take into account what Putin is trying to accomplish and the challenges posed by governance in the large and diverse country that is the Russian Federation. Only by doing so can we assess Putin's statecraft and its likely consequences.

Above all, the Russian president wants to strengthen the state to make Russia governable. In itself, this goal need not threaten democracy or a market economy. On the contrary, theorists of transition agree that without an effective state a democracy can be neither deep nor lasting. By a strong state



Putin Visiting Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

most scholars expect a reasonable degree of legal hierarchy and mechanisms that ensure that officials implement laws and policies most of the time. Or, that formal institutions or rules are supplemented rather than supplanted by informal practices, such as corruption.

While Vladimir Putin would no doubt like to have such a state, his approach to state-building has been shaped by the short-term challenge of overcoming the most obvious signs of state weakness. In his first term in office, this meant restoring the power of the central government to reverse the diffusion of power under Yeltsin to both the regions and republics (the equivalent of provinces in Canada) and the business tycoons known as "oligarchs." It meant as well planning a reform of public administration to curb the dominance of personal networks in government. But in

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Prognosis for Putin's Russia by Peter H. Solomon Jr.

and Alexei Trochev, page 1/Roméo Dallaire sees a New

World Disorder, page 3/Two takes on what Canada

needs: Richard Sandbrook, page 8 and Louis Pauly,

page 9/Lessons from the Iran Hostage Crisis, page 10.

EVENTS TO WATCH FOR

DISTINGUISHED LECTURERS

APRIL

Public Security and Terrorism: with Dr. James Young, federal advisor on Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and other top experts, April 1

MAY

Germany Beyond Borders: A Sense of Place

A conference sponsored by the Joint Initiative in German and European Studies



THE LIONEL GELBER
PRIZE

2004 Lionel Gelber Prize
Lecture and Award Ceremony,
Mar. 30 at the Munk Centre

2004 Winner:

Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.

By Steve Coll

The \$15,000 award for the best work of non-fiction on international issues is sponsored by the Lionel Gelber Foundation in partnership with the Munk Centre for International Studies and Foreign Policy Magazine.

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benefits from the predictability that the rule of law brings, a growing middle class that seeks protection for what it has managed to accumulate, a military that honours the civilian political leadership, and a majority that understands that it is only as good as the way it treats its minorities.

This issue of the Munk Centre Monitor focuses on Russia and its challenges of governance. It is not yet clear that Russia is a welcoming host for democratic values and practices. Civil society in Russia is active and engaged and the military certainly respects the long tradition of civilian leadership. But, as several experts in our Centre for Russian and East European Studies argue, respect for the rule of law, both by governments and by citizens, is thin. Without the rule of law, it is difficult for Russia to develop its potential, to move its economy forward into the global marketplace, and to build a society that respects its minorities, its weak, and its less privileged. Russia is a living laboratory in the experiment of embedding democracy where it has never flourished before. That experiment is far from over.

The imagery of democracy as a fast-replicating virus must be qualified in another way. Viral infections, we now know, come in many forms and mutate as they encounter different kinds of environments. Democratic values and practices also mutate as they move to different environments. The European and North American experience in democracy – often far from perfect in practice – is unlikely to be replicated in Russia or in the Middle East. Cultural traditions will shape political practices, institutions, and laws to reflect historical values. In Saudi Arabia, for example, it is easy to imagine town hall meetings that reflect the weekly encounters throughout the kingdom between princes and tribesmen. If democracy is at all like a virus, it will come in many forms and will mutate across cultures in ways that are difficult to predict and even more difficult to recognize. As virologists, we need to watch for the differences as much as for the similarities.

Janice Gross Stein, Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, is an acknowledged expert on conflict resolution and international relations, with an emphasis on the Middle East. A Fellow of the Trudeau Foundation, Professor Stein has served on many international advisory panels, including the Working Group on Middle East Negotiations at the United States Institute of Peace. She is currently a member of the Education Advisory Board to the Minister of Defence. Professor Stein is the co-author of We All Lost the Cold War (1994) and The Cult of Efficiency (2001).

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NEED A SOURCE?

Munk Centre scholars can be contacted for further comment on issues raised in this edition at munk.centre@utoronto.ca.
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MUNK CENTRE MONITOR

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A forum to extend and enhance the contribution of the Munk Centre for International Studies to public debate on important international issues and contribute to public education.

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Gelber Prize

THE LIONEL GELBER PRIZE


2004 Winner and Finalists

THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT PRIZE FOR NON-FICTION

The Gelber Prize, awarded annually for the best book in English on global issues, marks its 15th anniversary this year. The Economist calls the Gelber Prize "the world's most important award for non-fiction." Lionel Gelber was a renowned Canadian scholar and diplomat. The 2004 winner: Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll.




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GHOST WARS
The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
Steve Coll




THE LESSER EVIL
Political Ethics in an Age of Terror
Michael Ignatieff



THE MISSING PEACE
The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace
Dennis Ross



GLOBALIZED ISLAM
The Search for a New Ummah
Olivier Roy



A NEW WORLD ORDER
Anne-Marie Slaughter

CENTRE EVENTS

ROMÉO DALLAIRE ON "THE NEW WORLD DISORDER"


Canada's Lt-Gen. (Ret'd) Roméo Dallaire, former commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda, is engaged in new thinking about peacekeeping, conflict resolution and the promotion of human rights.

Currently a Fellow at Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Dallaire described the emergence of a "New World Disorder," its challenges and the potential strategies to deal with them at a Munk Centre event in January. His presentation, "When Humanity Fails: Rwanda, Sudan, Terrorism. Where are the Middle Powers?" was part of a larger series on the responsibility to protect.

In the new era, "80 per cent of humanity is deeper in need. It is characterized by ethnic cleansing, genocide, intra-state conflicts, global terrorism and legal mercenaries." Greater complexity means that Cold War era assumptions about waging and winning wars and the role of peacekeeping no longer apply. We have "stumbled into the new era on a hit and miss basis," he said.

"Classic peacekeeping no longer works," he noted. "UN blue berets go in with a mandate to observe and report, but they face a whole new complexity." Rwanda is an example. "When the Rwanda mission started in 1993, we fell into a situation of assassinations, arrests of moderates and massacres." Dallaire saw the barbarous killing of innocent civilians as a tool in the conflict.

The use of child soldiers is another troubling development. Dallaire estimates that there are about 300,000 child soldiers in militias worldwide. Lighter machine guns, like AK-47s, that can be carried easily by children have made this possible. About two million of these children have been injured or killed over the last decade. Typically, boys do the fighting, while girls organize logistics, become bush wives or sex slaves. Peacekeepers confronting these child soldiers face terrible situations. The girls often form human shields, standing in front of the boys doing the shooting. This raises a dilemma for a peacekeeper aiming his rifle sight on the head of a child. "Should you kill child soldiers?" There are other ethical dilemmas. "Do we negotiate with criminals – leaders with blood on their hands?"



"Traditional peacekeeping no longer works," said Dallaire.

And do we play with human rights?" In Rwanda, Dallaire requested permission to jam a local radio station that was broadcasting hate messages. His request was denied.

Dallaire also criticized the Western media for portraying situations like Rwanda, or Darfur as tribal conflicts. The West then comfortably dismisses the conflict as a case of black Africans killing each other, he said. On the contrary, these conflicts grow out of political and economic rivalries, with factions often led by Western-educated leaders.

Our options to deal with the new world disorder? "We can either build a wall around North America, with

security laws that usurp our freedoms and rights," he said. "Or we can go to the source of the rage, the 80 per cent of humanity that is still groveling." International development aid is a crucial solution for the future, he said: "Aid that gives a sense of human dignity, gives children an education."

Dallaire also called for strategic reforms, including multi-disciplined military leaders, with skills in sociology, anthropology or philosophy; a reformed United Nations; and a growing role for non-governmental

Dallaire: child soldiers pose a new dilemma.

organizations in addressing the living conditions that breed conflict. The world's Middle Powers, including Canada, should form coalitions to address these challenges, he argued. "We don't have a choice; it is a responsibility."

— with a report by Jason De Silva

The Dallaire event was part of the Munk Centre Distinguished Lecture Series and the Cambodian Genocide Group's Responsibility to Protect Lecture Series.

SEEN AND HEARD

Centre Events highlights just a few of the dozens of winter lectures and seminars organized in a collaborative effort by the full range of institutes and centres associated with the Munk Centre,* often with participation by other UofT departments.

Distinguished lecturers also included: **Michael Ignatieff** (Harvard) on "Intervention after Iraq: Some Second Thoughts," as part of the Cambodian Genocide Group's Responsibility to Protect Series; **Charles Taylor** (Chancellor Jackman Distinguished Visitor in the Arts, Prof. Emeritus McGill U.) on "Religion and Violence;" **Sir Nicholas Bayne** (London School of Economics) on "Prospects for the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit;" **Michael O'Hanlon** (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution) on "Why Canada Should Support America's Missile Defence Program But Not Spend Much On It;" **Edward Glaeser** (Harvard) on "The Creative City and the Consumer City: Urban Success in the Age of Global Cities;" **Julian Fantino** (chief, Toronto Police) and **Anthony Doob** (Centre for Criminology, U of T) on "Public Safety and Crime," as part of the Shared Citizenship Public Lecture Series; **Allan Sekula** (Research Fellow Guggenheim Foundation and others) on "The Lottery of the Sea," as part of the Chancellor Jackman Lecture Series in Remapping American Studies.

Seminar sessions, organized by the centers and institutes listed below, spanned a variety of fields, from European, Russian and U.S. studies, to Asian, South Asian, and global development issues, as well as Canadian foreign and defence policies.

Centres and Institutes of the Munk Centre include:

***AI:** Asian Institute; **CIS:** Centre for International Studies; **CPHS:** Comparative Program on Health and Society; **CREES:** Centre for Russian and East European Studies; **CSAS:** Centre for South Asian Studies; **CSUS:** Centre for the Study of the United States; **ESP:** European Studies Program; **IES:** UofT Institute of European Studies; **JIGES:** Joint Initiative in German and European Studies; **MAIR:** MA in International Relations; **MCIS:** Munk Centre for International Studies; **PJPSU:** Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine; **POWI:** Program on Water Issues.

CENTRE EVENTS



Go East young man: Participants in the Fourth Annual Business Symposium had an opportunity to assess strategies for investment in South Eastern Europe.



Speaking from experience: Peter Munk addresses the session.

Lands of Opportunity

At the Munk Centre's Fourth Annual Business Symposium, Canadian business leaders had an opportunity to assess investment strategies in South Eastern Europe. With membership in the European Union imminent for countries like Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, their investment climates are improving constantly, with huge potential for Canadians. Keynote speakers included Erhard Busek, the Brussels-based Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South East Europe and Peter Munk, Chairman and Founder of Barrick Gold. Mr. Munk spoke of his experience in the region, especially the activities of TriGranit Development Corporation, which is now a leading developer in the region. Sector specific panels included construction and tourism, mining and resources, financing, energy and telecommunications and advanced technology. The session was hosted by the Centre for Russian and East European Studies.

Allan Gotlieb on Canada-U.S. Relations

Allan Gotlieb, former Canadian Ambassador to Washington (1981-1989), provided fresh perspective and incisive comments on Canada-U.S. relations at the Munk Centre in February.

In an address entitled "Canada and the United States since 9/11," Gotlieb, a senior partner with the law firm Stikeman Elliot, provided a

candid overview of past and present relations in an entertaining tour de force. Gotlieb reviewed the major changes in the relationship, from the Special Relationship during the Cold War, to the multilateralism of the Trudeau era, which sought to reduce Canada's dependence on the United States, to the return of the Mulroney government to a bilateral approach. Ambassador Gotlieb set the scene for understanding the current relationship.



Former Ambassador Gotlieb: a tour de force.



Provocative thinking: Ironically, Canada has the most to lose should there be another terrorist attack in the U.S., said Gotlieb.

Gotlieb argued that Canadians must understand that for the U.S., the security agenda trumps all other aspects of the relationship. As a result, if we want Washington to pay attention to our interests, we had better pay attention to theirs. When we refuse to participate in ballistic missile defense, the U.S. government is not likely to be very sympathetic to our concerns

about trade. After 9/11, Canadians cannot afford to be complacent about U.S. security concerns. Ironically, Gotlieb argues, Canada has the most to lose should there be another successful terrorist strike against the U.S. The security clampdown on cross-border traffic that would ensue would do significant damage to Canada's trade with its largest partner.

CENTRE EVENTS



Breaking the silence: Victor Malarek, journalist and author of The Natashas – the Global Sex Trade (Viking Canada, 2003) passionately denounced the cruel conditions and coercion faced by women who are trafficked for sex. Other speakers at the Munk Centre event stressed the global reach of the business and that many of these women end up in massage parlours and strip joints in Canada.



Global thinker: Frannie Leautier (left), Vice President of the World Bank Institute joined Marketa Evans, Executive Director of the Munk Centre, at a session to discuss the work of the Institute in building capacity for development around the world. An arm of the World Bank, the Institute brings together local and global knowledge about development issues. The session was sponsored by the Munk Centre and the International Relations Society, an undergrad student group. Afterwards, Leautier participated in a session on the future of African cities, featuring World Bank experts and international scholars, sponsored by the Global Cities Program.



Fresh vision: Students Zahra Bhanji (left) and Adrian Mucalov were on hand at the Munk Centre to help launch "From Middle Power to Model Power," a report on Canada's future role in the world by Canada 25, a non-profit organization for people 25 to 35. For more information contact: www.Canada25.com.

Workshop: Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 2004 in Comparative Perspective

Participants:

- Daniel Bilak (Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP)
- Paul D'Anieri (University of Kansas)
- Marta Dyczok (University of Western Ontario, CREES Fellow)
- Taras Kuzio (George Washington University)
- Michael McFaul (Stanford University)

CREES experts

Registration:
Alesia Kachur at 416-946-8113 or jaczk.program@utoronto.ca

Time & Location:
Friday, Jan. 21, 1:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Vivian and David Campbell Conference Facility, Munk Centre

Analyzing the Orange Revolution

With Ukraine's Orange Revolution still reverberating around the world, international scholars gathered at the Munk Centre to discuss how and why this historic event occurred and the issues still facing the country. Hosted by the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) on Jan. 21, the session took place just two days before the inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko. An overflow audience was on hand to hear experts in the field analyze the significance of the peaceful transition.

Taras Kuzio of George Washington University traced Russian missteps in the campaign, at least in part, to the widespread refusal by Russians to perceive Ukraine as a foreign country.

This helps explain why Russian political advisers made so many mistakes in advising the losing presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich. According to Professor Kuzio, they excluded the possibility of a Georgian scenario in Ukraine and could not imagine the likelihood of the public protest that spread across the country after the runoff election on November 21. They also believed that Russian intrusion in the elections would remain unnoticed and that their attempts to play the traditional anti-Western / anti-American card — Yushchenko as CIA agent — would be digested by the population.

Marta Dyczok, a CREES Fellow and scholar from the University of Western Ontario, argued that the media played a crucial role in shaping public opinion during the election campaign. She provided evidence of

how the pro-Yanukovich, pro-Russian media created an information vacuum by following the party line, undermining the image of the popular opposition candidate Yushchenko and ignoring the checkered past of candidate Yanukovich. Into this vacuum stepped a few brave, unbiased media (in particular Channel 5), whose full coverage struck a resonant chord with electorate.

Daniel Bilak a lawyer with Gowling Lafleur Henderson, participated in the presidential elections in Ukraine as an official observer from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his view, the Orange Revolution has also become an East European Cultural Revolution, as the majority of Ukrainians "rejected Soviet and Eurasian values."

Mr. Bilak has also emphasized that the Orange Revolution was not directed against Russians. Rather, Yushchenko supporters were protesting against Vladimir Putin's policy towards Ukraine. He also noted that Ukrainians have always been perceived as a passive nation. That is why the scale of street protests not only took the Russian advisers by surprise, but also many Ukrainians. In his view, recent events in Ukraine have proven the power of the European values that Yushchenko supports.

Paul D'Anieri from the University of Kansas believes that three important shifts have taken place in the Ukrainian political system: the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system, the establishment of a fully

proportional system of representation, and the assignment of seats to parties rather than individual members of parliament. The shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system has been particularly important, as a link does exist between presidential systems and the breakdown of democracy, especially in the former Soviet Union.

According to Professor D'Anieri, there will be three major elements in the continuing battle for political reform: the battle to forge a majority in parliament, the battle during the upcoming parliamentary elections and the battle to build real political parties.

Michael McFaul of Stanford University compared the Orange Revolution with recent peaceful political upheavals in Serbia and Georgia. He noted that all three movements stemmed from a critical election in countries ruled by semi-autocratic regimes led by unpopular rulers. In all three, the successful opposition campaigns were campaigns against the incumbent governments. All three oppositions had the means to quickly create and disseminate the perception of a falsified vote. As well, crowds could quickly be mobilized in the capitals. Finally, there was division within the armed forces of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. For the audience, this helped to answer the vital question of why the military didn't respond to the Ukraine protests with tanks in the street.

Excerpted from an article in the CREES newsletter by Dave Morgan and Oksana Polyuga.

VLADIMIR PUTIN'S QUEST FOR A STRONG RUSSIA

Continued from page 1

his second term that began in winter 2004, Putin changed his standard. A strong state in Russia came to mean not merely a reasonable degree of central direction but also the “perfection of a system of power” (Putin’s own words), in which the various players, be they governors, oligarchs, or even judges, could be relied upon to cooperate with the President in the crunch. The irony is that a Russian state that emphasizes coordination without competition from coexisting loci of power, whether political, administrative or judicial, will likely encourage informal institutions and practices rather than the observance of formal rules, and as a result weaken rather than strengthen the capacity of the state.

Putin’s First Term: Restoring the “vertical of power”

On his accession to the presidency, Vladimir Putin was well aware of the diffusion of power that had occurred under his predecessor, and quickly announced his intention to restore the “vertical of power” in Russia through the creation of a “dictatorship of law” (in the sense of legal enactments, not rights). The choice of words was unfortunate, but they reflected Putin’s real, even naïve, faith in laws as the basis for political order. There were many parts to the project of reigning in regional leaders. One was the establishment of the seven federal district administrations, actually field offices of the presidential administration, to monitor what regional governments do and ensure that federal agencies in the field are not co-opted by regional leaders. Federal district officials also managed a campaign to harmonize the laws and regulations of the different levels of government, usually in favor of the centre, a process that involved the procuracy and the courts. Another part of this story was the replacement of the bilateral treaties between the federal government and its subjects with national level legislation that defined the rules for determining how powers and responsibilities in the many areas of joint jurisdiction would be divided between the centre and the regions. The new legislation was an outgrowth of a commission headed by a trusted Putin aide, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmitrii Kozak, on the division of powers and functions. In addition to establishing principles, the new laws centralized power in such crucial areas

as natural resources management.

Judicial Reform: An initial step in the right direction

If law was to be a core instrument of the new power structure (and also help improve the climate for investment in Russia), then the courts deserved better support than they had received under Yeltsin, and judges needed incentives to adjudicate impartially (or in the words of Minister of Economic Development German Gref, not to be able “to choose on whom to depend”). With the help of another (earlier) Kozak commission, Putin gave Russian courts a significant infusion of new funding starting in 2002 (raising salaries of judges, repairing court buildings, adding new staff, and computerizing the courts). Under Yeltsin, most judges had achieved security of tenure, with firing for cause possible only with the consent of their peers who sat on the Judicial Qualification Collegia.

Putin also approved controversial steps to increase the accountability of judges (or at least its appearance) by adding non-judges to the Judicial Qualification Collegia that handled the discipline of judges and approved judicial promotions. Overall, the performance of judges in most cases has been fair, and judges satisfy four out of five complaints brought by citizens against allegedly illegal actions taken by government officials. However, the public continues to be skeptical about the courts, believes that they are slow, and assumes that justice is for sale. (See sidebar on Canadian efforts to help Russian courts.)

So far, so good. All of this may be seen as justifiable correctives to the trends of the Yeltsin years and consistent with the principles of federalism as well as democracy. We come then to Putin’s relationship with the oligarchs. A few years ago, tycoons like Boris Berezovskii and Vladimir Gusinsky, who had become press barons and would be shapers of public opinion, fell victim to the threat of selective prosecutions and fled the country. More recently, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was starting to become a model business leader, became the target of such a prosecution and was brought to trial for alleged misconduct during the privatization era. His insistence, despite ample warning, on converting economic resources into political power sealed his fate, especially when he pursued policies at odds with the

President’s, e.g. on the routes of projected pipelines in the east and in effective lobbying in the Duma on a petroleum tax. Unfortunately for Khodorkovsky, his personal challenge to Putin coincided with the emergence of a higher standard for relations between the leadership and other centres of power that were now expected to become parts of the

performance through the development of new and improved criteria for its evaluation. The project is not over, but it has lost its priority status since the Beslan attack and the shift of Dmitrii Kozak to managing security in the south.

In the next couple of years expect a barrage of new laws relating to technical aspects of public adminis-



Yukos shareholder Khodorkovsky arrives at a Moscow court.

“system.” Unfortunately for Putin, the bankrupting of Khodorkovsky’s company Yukos bore all the signs of vengeance that flew in the face of the policy of improving the climate for business in Russia and efforts to advance property rights (see companion article by Alexei Trochev.)

Putin’s Second Term: Sidelined priorities

Vladimir Putin’s second term began with fanfare about a major administrative reform, and Putin’s most trusted aide Dmitrii Kozak was dispatched to the government to promote it. The project got off to a rocky start, focusing on the reorganization of agencies and reduction of high-level personnel (many deputy ministers became consultants with higher salaries). This “rationalization” was to pave the way for more serious initiatives: forcing agencies to make government contracts competitive; introducing competition into the recruitment of officials; and changing the incentives governing their

tration. Expect as well the resistance of officials to their implementation. It will not be easy to reduce corruption or develop an ethos of public service in Russian bureaucracy. Yet, without this ethos, the Russian state will continue to be plagued by informal practices that compete with or subvert formal institutions. One example is the requirement faced by many businesses to pay for protection (*krysha*), either from private purveyors or increasingly from the police themselves, who offer services for hire both after hours and on company time! Another example is the role played by the chairs of courts in trying to assure that cases that matter to powerful people are heard by judges known to be reliable.

Troubling Initiatives

The autumn of 2004 witnessed two troubling initiatives from the Putin administration, one concerning judges, the other governors. A few months ago, Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov

VLADIMIR PUTIN'S QUEST FOR A STRONG RUSSIA

introduced a draft law (allegedly written in the State Legal Administration of the President under the supervision of Putin aide Viktor Ivanov) that would change yet again the make up and method of choosing members of the Judicial Qualification Colleges. Judges would no longer constitute a majority and even the judge members would have to be confirmed by the Federation Council itself. This full-fledged attack on judicial self government (a crucial part of judicial power in Russian) may yet be checked. But, like the judicial counterreform urges of the late 19th century, it reflects an impatience among politicians with a judiciary that even in important cases sometimes rules against the government, as it did in the case of environmental whistle blower Nikitin. Judges, or at least the chairs of courts, must be part of the "system."

President Putin explained his plan to end the direct election of governors and republican presidents in a long television interview on November 18, 2004. Governors would now be nominated by the president and approved by regional legislatures. Putin stressed that the move had nothing to do with his personal power but rather with his dissatisfaction with the "functioning of the *system* in recent years." The problem with direct elections was that they could bring to power regional and republican leaders, who did not work *within the system* but even "disorganized" it. Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Putin argued, was a case in point; ethnic and economic clans battled one another and some wanted to create a "monoethnic republic." This kind of conflict could happen, he insisted, because there were no developed civil society and no functioning political parties. Moreover, elections in some parts of the country were unpredictable and enabled patently unsuitable persons to become governors or presidents. Direct election, therefore, was "premature." Although Putin spoke of the need for power at all levels to be accountable, it seems that he understands accountability, as did leaders in Soviet times, as accountability is to the centre, not to the people.

The basic message of Putin is this – that good governance requires that all persons with power work in a single *system*, coordinated directly or indirectly from the centre. The terrorist threat makes central coordination all the more urgent. A "politics

of fear" may be central to the story. Putting the governors and especially republican presidents into a hierarchical structure of power seems crucial to the new concept of an integrated and coordinated system of power, now taken to be a *sine qua non* of good governance in the Russian Federation. That this step promises to eliminate the main pocket of democratic accountability in contemporary Russia does not weigh significantly in the balance for Putin.

The crucial question is whether, if implemented, the new understanding of good governance will create the kind of strong state on which authentic democracy and civilized capitalism can be built. This kind of solid foundation for democracy is not likely, for the emergence of a state governed by legal rules rather than personal relationships requires a healthy dose of political competition. Otherwise, laws and courts in the restored state can too easily serve as tools for officials rather than as constraints upon them. Arguably, in Russia today the preoccupation with hierarchy and coordination downplays competition and accountability to the point where informal institutions remain more important than formal ones and the realization of a law-based state a dream for the future. In short, Putin may achieve a state that, while strong on paper, remains weak in practice.

Canada and Russia's Courts

Canadian legal experts, judges and scholars are putting their experience to use in an innovative project to contribute to ongoing judicial reform in Russia. Peter Solomon, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at the Munk Centre, is playing a major role in the project, called "The Canada-Russia Judicial Partnership". In October, the project brought together high court judges from Russia and Canada at the Munk Centre to discuss "Property Rights in Russian and Canadian Courts" (see Munk Centre Monitor Fall Issue). That conference was only one of many activities of the CIDA-funded project, which began in 2000.

The project, whose Canadian headquarters are at the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, has also organized an experiment aimed at improving the quality of the administration of justice in three of Russia's two thousand district courts. Judges from three Canadian provincial courts, along with Russian judges and court administrators from both countries studied each other's courts first hand and then collaborated in designing and creating "model" district courts. Located in Kursk, Voronezh and Kaluga, each of the three courts implemented organizational and technological changes aimed at promoting the project's core values: impartiality in adjudication, judicial creativity and thoroughness, accessibility of the courts to the public, and the efficiency of court administration. (For a book on the project, see CentreBooks p.11.) An anticipated Phase Two of the Project will include the development of training materials on Canadian style court administration and a battery of measures to improve court relations with the media and the public.

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA

ALEXEI TROCHEV

Investing money in a foreign country is always risky. Foreign investors, who seek to make profits abroad, need solid assurances that their assets will be safely protected. Nowhere is this more true than in Russia, as it makes the transition to a more or less market economy. Unfortunately, Russia's progress on entrenching property rights is so far more impressive on paper than in reality.

The reality of post-communist Russia shows how difficult it is to entrench property rights and to make the judiciary truly impartial in resolving property disputes.

On paper, Russia boasts a well-developed legal framework. Since 1990, Russian law-makers have been busy writing and rewriting commercial codes, property statutes and foreign investment laws on the advice of numerous Western legal advisers. The 1993 Russian Constitution declares the inviolability of private property and demands "equal" compensation for state confiscations of property. The 2001 Land Code, which was passed during Putin's first presidential term, allows the sale of land to foreigners. Similarly, Russia has passed laws on corporate governance and the protection of intellectual property rights.

Russia has also a relatively developed judicial system, which functions under recently updated procedural codes. The caseload of commercial courts is growing by 15-20 percent each year and reached one million cases in 2003, with about half the cases involving disputes between businesses and the government. Judges in these courts appear to adjudicate in an impartial manner. For example, in disputes over taxes they sided with taxpayers in 65-70 percent of the cases, and tended to award larger sums to private firms as compared to tax authorities. Courts treat requests to review the legality of numerous privatization deals with a great deal of suspicion and annul them only in exceptional cases, when judges determine that there was a malicious plot on the part of the buyer and seller and blatant violation of legal procedures (read – corruption). Russia's high and local courts are also increasingly friendly to foreign investors and to judgments of foreign courts and tri-

bunals in property disputes. The planned entrance of Russia into the World Trade Organization (WTO) during Putin's current (second) term in office is clearly based on these achievements, the Yukos affair notwithstanding.

However, laws and courts to enforce them do not make property rights real nor do they create confidence among business actors that their assets would be protected from their competitors and from the state. First, there is a long-standing tradition of the instrumental use of law by the state. Since 2000, President Putin has been actively signing federal statutes and "harmonizing" regional ones to fight recalcitrant local bosses, to concentrate the authority to rule at the federal level and to make the judiciary less dependent on local elites. Russia's business elite has joined this push for an instrumental use of law. By 2004, corporate bosses occupied most seats in the Federation Council, an upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. Formally, these CEOs are supposed to represent regional interests. In practice, many cash-strapped regions simply sell their seats in the Federation Council to these corporate bosses. They, in turn, use law to appropriate assets away from others through an abuse of bankruptcy processes, to create barriers to entry and maintain monopoly positions, and to force dissenting shareholders to sell their shares at a nominal price. If anything, this industrial lobby may guarantee the property rights for Putin's loyal oligarchs rather than for the rest of the private sector.

Second, the selling of parliamentary seats to a powerful corporate lobby in the absence of a functioning political party system reinforces the perception of widespread weakness and corruption in the political process and legal system. A 1999 survey conducted jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank revealed that a staggering 75 percent of firms in Russia (and in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine) stated that they disagreed with the statement "I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes." And only 9 percent of business managers in Russia said it was "sometimes," "frequently," "mostly," or "always" necessary for their firms to make

Continued on page 8

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA

Continued from page 7

extra, unofficial payments to public officials in order to influence the content of new laws, decrees, or regulations. In recent years, ordinary Russians as well have come to distrust their courts because of corrupt practices and pro-government and pro-big business biases. If anything, Russians fail to appreciate the major improvements in judicial performance actually achieved in the past decade.

Putin's reforms (see main story) also appear to be reinforcing this perception of corrupt and inefficient legal protection of property rights. Politicians are openly discussing judicial corruption, while the mass media is full of sensationalist stories about court decisions for sale and judicial red-tape. Judges, in turn, complain about the pressure and threats from federal and local politicians in cases involving valuable pieces of property or large amounts

of money. Between 2001 and 2003, there were 112 attacks on Russian judges, the majority of whom are women. 45 judges and their family members were murdered (22 in 2003 alone), and 71 were injured, in addition to 47 bombings and arson attacks against courthouses.

As well, the Russian government has increasingly failed to implement court judgments to transfer property or assets to the winning party in the litigation. In 2002, Russia's 33,000 bailiffs managed to collect a mere 1 billion rubles out of 1 trillion rubles awarded by courts in the cases of non-payment of debts that they handled; that is one thousandth of what the courts awarded! To alleviate this crisis, President Putin ordered the hiring of an additional 12,000 bailiffs in 2003, but to no avail. That year, as Yuri Chaika, Russian Justice Minister, openly complained, 45,000 bailiffs collected no more than 10 percent of

money of all court-ordered monetary awards, and declared every fifth tax collection order as "impossible to collect."

Finally, the federal government under Putin increasingly disregards unfavorable court decisions. By April 2004, Russia accumulated a record 6 bln rubles (\$300 mln CAD) in unpaid awards after losing 34,000 court cases to private individuals and corporations. Putin's reshuffle of the federal Cabinet in the spring of 2004 failed to reverse this chronic disrespect of judicial power. Regional governors, who soon will be nominated by Putin and confirmed by regional legislatures, may follow suit and protect some property rights and not others.

The Russian transition to a market economy teaches us that the law and courts in weak states do not make property rights real. What makes them real is an effective state with capable bureaucracy, a bureaucracy

that obeys court judgments in property disputes and respects rather than preys upon private property. Bureaucrats issue property titles, business licenses and permits, and enforce court-ordered transfers of property. If these officials fail to obey court judgments, while their bosses lack the will or the capacity to stop this sabotage of judicial power, property rights remain worthless, regardless of progressive laws and more or less impartial judges. Without reforming public governance (improving the structure of formal and informal incentives for public officials), property rights in Russia will continue to be protected arbitrarily, and President Putin's dream of doubling Russia's GDP by 2010 will remain a dream.

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REINVENTING CANADA

RICHARD SANDBROOK

Anation, Frank Underhill suggested, is a group of people who have done great things together in the past, and look forward to doing great things together in the future. What are the great things that we Canadians aspire to do together in the future? Who might we become? Today, we are



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faced with a shocking lack of imagination at all levels. We are content to define ourselves by the achieve-

ments of earlier generations. As we tread water, the world passes us by.

Once upon a time, Canada built a reputation for innovation. We invented peacekeeping, but now we are a minor player in brokering peace around the world. We were a major aid donor, but now our aid programme is both niggardly and ineffective. We championed international environmental agreements, but now we cannot plan how to implement the minimal goals of the Kyoto Accord. We pioneered multiculturalism, but now we do nothing as visible minorities sink into a permanent, impoverished underclass. We proudly built a welfare state, but we have run out of ideas on how to safeguard our social programmes, especially health care. We deviated from the U.S. norm in forging "cities that work," but they work no longer as the infrastructure frays and poverty grows. We are living on inherited capital, and that capital is rapidly depleting.

What has gone wrong? Why are we so unable to respond to the challenges of the 21st century? Of the many causes, two stand out: our current undervaluing of the role of government, and the impoverishment of our intellectual life.

The neoconservative onslaught of the past two decades has succeeded in implanting the notion that

governmental activism is futile. Governments cannot achieve great things on behalf of their citizens because of a lack of market discipline: politicians pursue self-serving goals and bureaucrats get tied up in red tape. Better then to broaden the sphere of the market and individual decision-making. This message bombards the public from the conservative, and highly concentrated, mass media, right-wing think-tanks and foundations, and political parties heavily dependent on corporate donations. But a nation cannot aspire to do great things together if its government is disarmed, if the major issue of election campaigns is the size of the tax cut.

As for university intellectuals, we lack what Kierkegaard called a passion for the possible. Our reward system in the social sciences – based on publication in highly ranked professional journals and presses – encourages conformity with prevailing methodologies and theoretical approaches. There is a bias in favour of understanding "probabilities," but against pursuing "possibilities" (to follow Albert O. Hirschman's distinction.) Probabilities entail discovering the regularities and uniform sequences that explain what is, what exists – and such discovery is, of course, the proper role of the social scientist. But, Hirschman urged, we should also

search for *possibilities* – the hidden opportunities for valued change that lurk in a particular situation. We should, in other words, concern ourselves with *what might be*, as well as *what is*. Yet social scientists tend to regard the former as mere speculation. We social scientists thus disarm ourselves. Those who devote their lives to scholarship abjure the informed speculation that might allow Canada to turn a historical corner, to help define the great things we might do together in the future.

To move forward, we need to proudly embrace "tax-and-spend liberals" who believe in an activist, democratic government and to struggle against disciplinary strictures of scholarly non-engagement. In a world as fraught with problems as our own – global warming and climate change, ecological decline, growing intra-country and global inequalities, persistent poverty, looming energy shortages, the challenge of terrorism, deadly violence and state collapse in the global south, and conflicts over ever-scarcer fresh water – there is no shortage of great things we can do together. But, as one hundred Nobel laureates observed in a statement marking the centenary of the Nobel Prize: "To survive in the world we have transformed, we must learn to think in a new way."

DEFINING CANADA'S INTERESTS – UNCLOSED BY ANTI-AMERICANISM

LOUIS W. PAULY

The public expression of anti-American feelings by prominent Canadians has recently subsided. This is all to the good. Still, the re-election of George W. Bush has put new energy into deeper, if less public, debates about the nature of the ties that bind Canadians together and the differences that distinguish the citizens of Canada and the United States. If our leaders focus on Canadian interests in the world beyond our shores, they will disavow the ideology of anti-Americanism. We need them to do so.

Nationalism provides an important ideological foundation stone for the modern Canadian state. The same is true for other states. To be sure, ours is a more complicated nationalism than that of many others, but it still draws boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, between “us” and “them.” In such a context, the twin challenges for statecraft in an open world order are obvious. First, Canadians must acknowledge their sense of solidarity so that they can act collectively. Second, they must be convinced that it is in their interest to contribute to global problem solving.

In the recent past, when the word “globalization” was becoming commonplace, some argued that Canada could lead the world in eschewing nationalism. We were global citizens. We could construct the world’s first post-national state, a polity that would carry out moral duties beyond our fading borders.

But then the world changed. In the wake of 9/11, North American borders that not long before seemed to be disappearing once again became all too obvious. So, too, did economic vulnerabilities once thought to have been mitigated both by NAFTA and by a reformed WTO. It became clear that growing environmental, economic, and security dilemmas both near and far from Canada’s territory required the commitment of real resources from Canadians. In both the public and the private sector, priorities needed to be reviewed to realign spending with new challenges and new priorities.

Some of our leaders first tried to obfuscate the core issue. Something called “the international community” could solve problems. Or the “Americans” could take the lead, and we could help them if asked. In this light, we acquitted ourselves well and

honourably in the Afghanistan war, even if the undoubted heroism of our inadequately equipped troops became all too clear in the face of tragic U.S. tactical mistakes. With an unusual and welcome sense of spontaneity, we also recently demonstrated great generosity on the wake of the South Asian tsunami. Nevertheless, on other border-spanning issues, from environmental remediation to halting the spread of catastrophic diseases, we accomplished much less beyond scoring rhetorical victories.

Avoiding serious and substantive trade-offs as global policy problems expanded became increasingly awkward. The inept diplomacy of the first George W. Bush administration, especially but not only in the period just before the Iraq war, proved convenient. Even some who knew better reverted to a tried and true expedient – anti-Americanism – that promised to bolster internal solidarity and make us feel good, even righteous. Best of all, it gave us a fresh excuse for actually doing very little.

A fine line has always existed between the kind of nationalism the Canadian state needs and the kind it can quickly muster. The nationalism that Canada needs was evocatively captured by Richard Gwyn a few years ago in the title of his fine book, *Nationalism Without Walls*. The nationalism that Canada needs depends on eliding the fundamental contradiction that we can be both Americans and not Americans at the same time.

We read in prize-winning books that we are actually becoming Scandinavians, while our cousins to the South are heading toward some barbaric place located in the 19th century. We use national averages to divert attention from deepening regional convergence within North America. We forget the important distinction between our compatriots’ observable preferences for social integration in a diverse North American society and their abiding preferences for political autonomy on the North American continent. We let antipathy to a currently, and temporarily, dominant governing coalition in the United States cloud perceptions of our own basic interests in a world that we helped make more open and interdependent.

Frankly, the wider policy interests of Canada and of the United States remain much the same. They include the prevention of another 9/11 and the defence of our shared geographical space from conventional and

unconventional threats, stable energy markets, sustainable development in the developing world, a secure Israel, a durable Palestinian state, the control of weapons capable of what Michael Ignatieff in a lecture in the Munk Centre two months ago called the ‘superempowering’ of individuals, the peaceful integration of China in an open world order, the mitigation of public health emergencies in Africa and elsewhere, and the remediation of our physical environment. These mutual interests shared by citizens of Canada and the United States cannot be fundamentally contradicted by the ideology of anti-Americanism. That we must respond jointly with the United States does not threaten our political independence. Of course we should participate actively in debates about specific mutual policies to achieve our mutual interests, but it makes no sense for us to draw lines in the sand when our U.S. counterparts disagree. There is always plenty of internal disagreement within the United States on specific policies. Whether the issue is ballistic missile defence or global warming, we stand a chance of achieving our own objectives only when we act in concert. Pragmatism, not dogmatism, is clearly required when U.S. decision-makers are themselves exhibiting dogmatic tendencies. The point of maintaining political autonomy is to give our own decision-makers the space needed to exercise wisdom and patience. Walking away from the table where policies are made, which an ideology of anti-Americanism encourages, is the surest way to shrink our room for maneuver.

Canadians have proved recently and in the past that we are capable of contributing wisely and constructively to global order. Indeed, we do have distinctive strengths and potential capabilities, significantly now based on openness to the inflow of people aspiring to be Canadians. We remain, in fact, deeply embedded in the alliance that has led the international system ever since the middle of the twentieth century. Acknowledging our role in the alliance does not weaken the state that acts in our name. Pro-Canadianism does not have to imply anti-Americanism. When we are properly led, our complicated nationalism can continue to construct a novel political identity that requires no external enemy, save the great challenges that must be confronted, managed and resolved.



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“Nationalism provides an important ideological foundation stone for the modern Canadian state.”

LESSONS OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS



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RICK HALPERN AND MOHAMAD TAVAKOLI-TARGHI

After a long period of absence from the world stage, Iran has burst back into the news headlines as controversy swirls around its nuclear program. On one side, the Bush administration has engaged in bellicose posturing towards the Islamic Republic, labeling it as part of an “axis of evil” bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. On the other, Iran insists its intentions are peaceful. In the middle, European countries are attempting to resolve the dispute through dialogue with Iran. While it is the country’s nuclear program rather than weapons of mass destruction per se that has attracted American attention, the United States has not ruled out the use of force against Iran in order to prevent the development of nuclear weapons. Both the war of words and the threat of military action, carry a strange sense of déjà vu. Exactly 25 years ago Iran and the United States squared off in a 444-day-long hostage crisis that left a lasting imprint upon the political culture of both countries. That crisis has some sobering lessons for the current impasse.

In mid-November 2004, former hostages, a number of the Iranian principals, and scholars of the United States and Iran gathered at the Munk Centre for International Studies to reflect on the 1979 crisis. Organized jointly by the Centre for the Study of the United States and the Toronto Initiative for Iranian Studies, scholars and policy makers who participated in the two-day conference drew precautionary conclusions for contemporary policy and highlighted the still poorly understood Canadian role in the resolution of the hostage drama.

For Americans, the legacy has been lasting. The 1979 hostage crisis produced a number of iconic images indelibly burned into popular political consciousness: grainy photographs of blindfolded hostages, the charred wreckage of helicopters in the desert,

and the dazed visage of President Jimmy Carter lamely fielding questions from an aggressive press corps. Indeed, one of the most important legacies of the crisis has been to underscore the limits of United States power in the post-Vietnam era and thus to provide a political opening for Republicans whose promise of restoring the nation’s military strength and prestige in foreign affairs has struck a responsive chord amongst voters. On the national level, Ronald Reagan brilliantly exploited this situation to defeat the hapless Carter in 1980; George Bush (*père et fils*) have also been beneficiaries of Americans’ nostalgic desire for an era of unchallenged might and their reluctance to come to terms with the new realities of the post-industrial, post-Cold War era.

Indeed, one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the hostage crisis was the futility of applying Cold War paradigms to radical Islamic politics. Gary Sick, a member of the National Security Council under Jimmy Carter, recalled at the conference how he vainly attempted to convince his superior, Zbigniew Brzezinski, that neither the student radicals holding the hostages nor the Islamic revolutionaries behind Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini should be regarded as creatures of Soviet design. Similarly, historian David Farber of Temple University, author of the recent *Taken Hostage*, commented that Brzezinski firmly believed that the instability produced by an unchecked Iranian revolution, coupled with the Carter administration’s inability to support the exiled Shah, would provide the Soviets with an opportunity to seize Persian Gulf oil fields. Blinded by their focus on the USSR, NSC staff members, State Department officials, and White House advisors all avoided analysis of the unfolding revolution and its

divisions.

Had the Americans better understood the powerful forces within Iran that unseated the Shah and, ultimately, produced the hostage crisis, they would have appreciated that the radical Islamicists centered around Khomeini were but one current within a diverse coalition driving the revolution. Mohsen Milani, a political scientist at the University of South Florida and author of *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution*, explored this point at the Munk Centre conference, pointing out how Khomeini astutely used the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran to silence secular left-wing forces within the coalition that earlier had taken the mullahs to task for underestimating the imperialist nature of the American presence in Iran. Whether these secular radicals, or the liberals with ties to the Iranian business community, would have made better negotiating partners than the Khomeini-headed Revolutionary

particularly American, eyes as a rogue state that can’t be trusted.

The hostage crisis left an imprint on Canadian political culture and consciousness as well. Within hours of the November 1979 takeover of the US Embassy, Canada’s Ambassador to Tehran, Kenneth Taylor, boldly intervened to shelter several American staffers who had managed to flee the compound and arranged to smuggle them out of Iran in an imaginative cloak-and-dagger operation. While modest in the larger framework of the crisis and its resolution, the rescue briefly placed Canada in the international spotlight alongside the two protagonists and, for a longer period, enhanced the country’s standing in the eyes of Washington and the hearts of the American people. Speaking at the conference, Taylor recalled the outpouring of support and adulation that greeted him upon his return to North America 25 years ago. He commented ruefully on the absence of



Iranian demonstrators burning American flag on U.S. Embassy

Council is difficult to say. But it is now clear that the American conviction that a lurking Soviet presence lay behind the revolution encouraged the U.S. to confront Khomeini. This, in turn, ensured that Khomeini and the other ayatollahs would be able to consolidate their hold on power and marginalize secular alternatives to Islamic law and institutions.

Within Iran, the result has been two decades of hardline theocracy characterized by repression of secular, democratic forces, which continues. (Nonetheless, opposition to the regime persists, within the 60 per cent of the population under 20, and among educated Iranians.) Internationally, discussants pointed out, Iran gained a lasting reputation in Western, and

this kind of generosity of spirit after the Chrétien government decided to stand aloof from the “coalition of the willing” that waged war against Saddam Hussein.

Participants at the conference recalled the hostage crisis at a time when tension is again growing between the United States and Iran. Again, Iran’s reputation in the international community is at stake, this time over its nuclear policy. While the U.S. favours sanctions against Iran by the U.N. Security Council, other nations are encouraging a dialogue with Iran. It is important to remember that war was averted 25 years ago by multilateral action that eventually led to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

RECENT BOOKS BY MUNK CENTRE SCHOLARS




Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Since 1998, which marked the end of the 33-year New Order regime under President Suharto, there has been a dramatic increase in ethnic conflict and violence in Indonesia. Jacques Bertrand argues that some of these conflicts were a result of the New Order's narrow and constraining reinterpretation of Indonesia's national model.




Peter H. Solomon, Jr., and Pamela Ryder-Lahey, *Model District Courts in Action*, 2004.

This bilingual (Russian-English) volume documents part of the positive experience of The Canada-Russia Judicial Partnership to date in improving the administration of justice in Russia's district courts (page 7). Another volume (in Russian) *Managing Courts: A Manual for Court Administrators and Chairs*, written by a team of Canadians and Russians, is forthcoming.




Frank Iacobucci and Carolyn Tuohy, eds., *Taking Public Universities Seriously*, University of Toronto Press, 2005.

From a December 2004 symposium held at the Munk Centre. Experts in the study and analysis of post-secondary education and related fields and university leaders from a range of jurisdictions considered how public universities – central pillars of successful societies – and the public-policy framework that sustains them have come under severe stress across nations.



Gustavo Indart, ed., *Economic Reforms, Growth and Inequality in Latin America: Essays in Honor of Albert Berry*, Ashgate Publishing, 2004.

Growth, income distribution, and labour markets are issues of pivotal importance in the Latin American context. Examining unique theoretical issues and the empirical evidence, this book provides a critical analysis of the key elements of income distribution determinants, labour market functions, trade policies, and their interrelations.




Sadako Ogata, Jacques Delors, Michel Camdessus, Renato Ruggiero, Enrique V. Iglesias and Paul Volcker, eds., *At the Global Crossroads*, McGill-Queens' University Press, 2003.

Exploring the many facets of a globalized world economy, this collection ranges from discussions of the global economic challenges of the 21st century to the particular economic opportunities for Canada and Latin America; from recession in the globalized economy, to humanitarian aid for people displaced by conflict within their own country.




Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John J. Kirton, eds., *Sustaining Global Growth and Development*, Ashgate Publishing, 2003.

What are the new challenges for sustaining growth in the 21st century and how are the G7 and IMF meeting these challenges amidst emergent processes of regionalism such as currency consolidation in Asia and economic union in Africa? Aspects of global economic governance are discussed oriented around the G7/8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta.



Derek J. Penslar, Michael R. Marrus and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *Contemporary Antisemitism*, University of Toronto Press, 2005.

Distinguished scholars and leaders discuss the contemporary meaning of antisemitism – a pressing problem not only in the Middle East and Europe but also in North America. They map the terrain of antisemitic thought and practice, distinguish between expressions of antisemitism across time and space, and put various strategies of response into critical perspective.



Meric S. Gertler, *Manufacturing Culture: The Institutional Geography of Industrial Practice*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

How to account for fundamental differences between manufacturing firms in North America, Europe, and Asia in adopting new practices? Meric Gertler's new conception of industrial practice and firm behaviour demystifies the origins of national and regional industrial cultures, and shows that distinctive national models are not converging around a single global norm.

CULTURE IN THE COMMUNITY: PROKOFIEV

Music, dance, film, and insightful commentary highlighted a symposium on the life and works of Russian composer Sergey Prokofiev (1891-1953) in February. Hosted by the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) of the Munk Centre, the symposium was entitled *Prokofiev Onstage: New Light on a Modern Master*. The all-day event lived up to its billing, offering an international roster of invited experts who shared their perspectives on one of the 20th century's major creative figures.

The symposium was part of a week-long celebration of the composer, whose works span most musical genres, from operas, symphonies and piano works, to ballet and film scores. Conceived and organized by performer and musicologist Sterling Beckwith (YorkU), who is a longtime Senior Fellow of CREES, the Toronto Prokofiev Festival was a successful exercise in interdisciplinary collaboration and community outreach. As many as six different academic units and three professional arts organizations were involved, along with key members of Toronto's cultural community. As CREES director Peter Solomon noted: "The Prokofiev Festival continues a tradition at CREES of presenting cultural happenings that bring to the public a combination of performance and scholarship."

The symposium began with a searching examination by American opera scholar and critic Michael Pisani (chair of Music, Vassar) of a less-familiar Prokofiev masterwork, *A Love for Three Oranges*, tracing its problematic history. This sparkling fairy-tale opera, first produced in 1921, was given a rare professional performance by Toronto's Opera in Concert company the following day, as the pièce de résistance of the Prokofiev Festival.


Other presenters joined Pisani in exploring the impact on Prokofiev of conflicting artistic trends before and during the Soviet era. As Tamara Trojanowska (Slavic Languages and Literatures, U of T) pointed out, Russian artists and critics of various generations and political leanings "could not agree on how to present the truth of life." Some were strongly influenced by doctrines of naturalism and later, socialist realism, which challenged the symbolist ideals of the composer's youth, and were challenged in turn by the modernist innovations of directors like Meyerhold and Eisenstein, with whom the composer collaborated.

According to Princeton musicologist and Prokofiev biographer Simon Morrison – a U of T alumnus who also gave the Festival's keynote lecture two days earlier – Prokofiev's later works can indeed serve as evidence of a struggle between ideology and personal artistic vision. After living as an emigré artist in New York and Paris in the Twenties, he moved back to Stalin's Russia in the

mid-1930s, a decision that in retrospect seemed questionable at best; yet despite increasing pressures to conform, he composed some of his finest and most beloved music there. As a composer, he always felt he was far above mere politics, Morrison said. A devout Christian Scientist, he believed that evil is not real, since we are all a product of the divine good. So when confronted with the demands of a totalitarian regime, his response was, in effect, "I will take whatever drivel you give me and turn it

"certain he had achieved his goals: toeing the party line, yet traveling far beyond it in his music." But after 1948, when the opera was censored and officials denounced him as an anti-Soviet decadent, Prokofiev recognized that even his high artistry and world renown were not enough, as long as "socialist realism meant whatever the bureaucrats of the day wanted it to mean."

The unique language used by Soviet critics to explain the presumed ideological significance of Prokofiev's



Painting by Rudolf Bickers. Giclée prints, sized 13" x 19", are available in a limited edition of 25, numbered and signed by the artist on archival paper, through a contribution to the CREES Culture Fund (contact: 416-946-8994 or janet.hyer@utoronto.ca).

into transcendent artistry." But as Morrison observed, "the more Prokofiev tried to make his music accessible and popular, the more it became criticized for its sarcasm."

In his response, journalist and Russianist Paul Mitchinson also commented on Prokofiev's so-called Sovietization, arguing that neither "collaborator" nor "martyr" is an appropriate label for the composer. "In 1947, working for the state was simply 'the price to be paid for peace.'" At first, Prokofiev must have felt that he could have the best of both worlds. In his opera *The Story of a Real Man*, Prokofiev was

compositional output was given further nuanced analysis by Jiri Smrz (History, UofT). Taking as his point of departure an article by I. Nestyev, Smrz showed how critical discourse in the Stalin era could have the effect of legitimizing, or de-legitimizing, the message and content of even such a non-verbal artwork as Prokofiev's Fifth Symphony.

The symposium also included a panel discussion of Prokofiev's contribution to Russia's great pianistic tradition, moderated by opera commentator Iain Scott and featuring music critic William Littler (*Toronto Star*) and pianist Jamie

Parker (Music, UofT), who had just played in a faculty concert of Prokofiev chamber works at Walter Hall the night before. When Littler noted that Prokofiev was "not just their piano-pounder-in-chief," Parker agreed, saying his music "allows us to explore the hero archetype within us, with music that gets our heart going and our blood pounding."

A highlight of the day's varied program was the live dance demonstration of scenes from the composer's best-known ballets *Romeo and Juliet* and *Cinderella*, presented and choreographed by Artistic Director James Kudelka of the National Ballet of Canada. Performing barefoot and with minimal costumes, accessories or lighting, his dancers deftly illustrated Prokofiev's pensive themes of romance, youthful anticipation and tragic demise.

In his 1926 ballet *Le pas d'acier*, with its factory scenes and assaulting, boldly dissonant music, the composer addressed modernism and modernity head-on, according to Lesley-Anne Sayers (Research Fellow in Dance, University of Roehampton, U.K.). Sayers is helping to resurrect this early constructivist work for its U.S. "premiere" at Princeton later this year. Ultimately this work, intended as a gesture of partnership with the new regime in the composer's homeland, is a celebration of industrialization; yet it also shows dancers being caught in the "despotism of the machine." When first produced, some thought the ballet was mere agitprop, but others read its mixed messages quite differently.

Additional speakers included: Nelly Kravetz (Musicology, Tel Aviv University), who brought the fruits of her recent research in Moscow archives, where she was able to uncover the crucial behind-the-scenes maneuvering that preceded the first Soviet performances of *Romeo and Juliet*; and dance historian Selma Odom (YorkU), who used rare video clips to survey concert dance works created to Prokofiev music by major Canadian and international choreographers — among them one by modern dance pioneer Peggy Baker, whose Dance Theatre also gave a recital of Prokofiev-inspired pieces during the Festival week. Simon Morrison concluded the day by screening two "unknown" Soviet films he discovered in Moscow, scored by Prokofiev but never released.

Thanks to the symposium's compelling mix of ideas and images, current research and live performing artistry, its appreciative audience left with deepened understanding of an enduring modern master.

— with reporting by
Oksana Kachur and Jason De Silva